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SUMMARY 
The last two decades of world economic development were earmarked by several 
important changes. From the angle of a transition economy in Central Europe two of 
them stand out the most: (i) the economic transition from central planning back to 
market economy and (ii) the evolution of a new technological and economic paradigm, 
i.e. a knowledge-based economy and society. The parallel appearance of the two proc-
esses opened up a rare window of development and catching-up for these economies, 
since mass scale replacement of production inputs specialized on the needs of central 
planning and eastern-block alliance became unavoidable. This urgent need for massive 
investments in new capital goods, education and corporate networks could incorporate 
production means and other carriers of codified knowledge of the new technological 
paradigm. It could also help define the new role of these countries in the currently 
reshaping new world-economic labour division. This study makes an attempt of evalua-
tion of the corroboration of these two processes in Hungary. 
Based on an extensive review of literature on the evolution of the knowledge-
based economy the authors tried to define the extension to which Hungary has been 
affected by the new development processes until recently. The paper also highlights 
some special aspects of the Hungarian development path of the knowledge-based econ-
omy. Two of them stand out. One is the size and the background of Hungarian firms 
that rarely allow the direct participation in knowledge-based international co-operation 
networks. Instead, they may still find many market niches that cannot be covered by 
the new ICT-based technologies. There are also market segments where the use of 
cheap labour provides an alternative to the expensive application of ICT. The other 
important aspect is the mass-scale employment of Hungarian labour in ICT-based pro-
duction networks through the local affiliates of multinational companies. 
Since Hungary has not been left untouched by ICT and other elements of the 
knowledge-based economy and society, it is crucial to define the specific requirements 
of this development model towards the supply of manpower and economic policy. After 
the definition of the changes that were brought along with the new development, the 
paper concentrates on these two distinct areas. First, it describes the potential roles 
that Hungarian economic agents, companies and employees may play in the new la-
bour division. Here the circumstances of increased international tasks and labour mo-
bility are also taken into account. Second, the paper assesses those institutions and 
policies that were aimed at facilitating the Hungarian integration in the new techno-
logical paradigm. The role of Science Parks and Cooperative Research Centres are at 
the core of this discussion. 
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1) THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED 
ECONOMY
* 
 
Functional description 
Traditional economic theory recognized 
only land, labour and capital as factors 
of production. Knowledge was formerly 
considered as a source of increasing re-
turns, because it can be reused without 
cost once created. Recently, this has been 
radically changed, because technology 
developments in the last century have 
transformed the majority of wealth-
creating processes from a physically 
based platform to a knowledge-based 
one. The Internet now means information 
can be transported instantaneously 
around the world, and any advantage 
gained by one company can be elimi-
nated ‘overnight’. The only comparative 
advantage is the company’s ability to de-
rive values from the information flow 
resulting in knowledge. Technology and 
knowledge have become essential factors 
of production in what amounts to an 
emerging new era.  
According to OECD researchers, the 
knowledge-based economy is directly 
based ‘on the production, distribution 
and use of information and knowledge’ 
(OECD 1996, p. 7). This definition em-
phasizes the importance of two elements 
in an emergent continuum represented 
                                                 
* This study was prepared for the KNOGG re-
search project, Work Package No. 4. 
by the sequence of data information 
knowledge wisdom (Miller 1999, p. 87). 
To demonstrate their differences, it is 
necessary to draw a distinction between 
knowledge on the one hand and infor-
mation and data on the other.  
Because information requires a rela-
tion to subsist between data (Fleming 
1996), data as such is not information. 
This relation is strongly dependent on the 
present context and has few implications 
for the future. Because the relation de-
pends on the emerging associations influ-
enced by prior cognition by the recipient, 
it is possible to derive various stocks of 
information from the same data. As Bel-
linger (1997) has shown, information re-
lates to description, definition or perspec-
tive (what, who, where and when). 
Beyond the relations, there is a pat-
tern (Bateson 1988) among data and in-
formation with the potential to represent 
knowledge. It only becomes functional, 
however, when the pattern and its impli-
cations are grasped and understood. 
When applied to information, such a 
pattern bestows greater completeness, so 
that knowledge includes strategy, practice 
or method (how). 
Knowledge theory draws a funda-
mental distinction between explicit (codi-
fied) and tacit knowledge. Boutellier 
(2000, p. 208) described codified knowl-
edge as being embodied in products or 
documented knowledge. He also placed 
tacit knowledge in two categories: ex-
perienced knowledge (know-how) and 
social knowledge. The transfer processes 
of codified knowledge clearly differ from 
those of tacit knowledge, which is not 
easily transmitted and thus not an obvi-
ous source of increasing returns. Lan-
glois (2001) has proved nonetheless that 
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knowledge does not have to be codified 
to generate economic growth. 
Apart from speeding up economic 
growth, knowledge can bring structural 
changes in the economy. Neef (1998) 
stated that new products and emerging 
services resulting from knowledge-
mediated growth can bring profound 
changes in the nature of the work, e.g. 
from low skill requirements to high. 
Development path and a working 
definition 
It was pointed out by Amidon Rogers 
(1996) that five major forces influencing 
the global marketplace have to be un-
derstood to grasp the business opportu-
nities provided by the global economy: 
shifts from information to knowledge, 
bureaucracies to networks, training to 
learning, national to transnational, and 
competition to cooperation. All result in 
the emergence of virtual networked or-
ganizations working by collaborative 
learning systems that enable flows of 
knowledge throughout the organization.  
Rogers describes such changes in 
the five-step evolution of R and D man-
agement, but it can easily be extended 
to the general business strategy of the 
firms, as they radically affect even the 
strategic management of firms. Such an 
extension allows documentation of a 
four-generation evolution of management 
approaches towards a knowledge-driven 
economy comprising knowledge-based 
companies. 
(i) Mainly tangible assets were managed. 
In those days, the strategy was effec-
tively to manage equipment and pro-
duction lines to provide maximum 
value to owners. The core strategy 
operated in isolation and tangible as-
sets provided the majority of the 
economic value of a company. 
(ii) The combination of different func-
tional areas made the project the 
prime asset to be managed, which 
resulted in successful product devel-
opment and greater market focus. 
Later, as formal linkages between 
functional areas stabilized, the enter-
prise became the asset to be man-
aged, and managers considered as 
their main task risk minimization and 
sharing of rewards across the firm. 
(iii) Management turned to customers, 
because the best way to achieve 
rapid changes in the global market-
place was seen to be concurrent 
learning with customers. New prod-
uct ideas were validated at an early 
stage by customer comments. In this 
phase, the customer was the asset to 
be managed and customer satisfac-
tion the overall focus.  
(iv) Nowadays, as the knowledge-driven 
economy dawns, knowledge is the as-
set to be managed. Business per-
formance in this phase can be meas-
ured by the ability to create and ap-
ply new ideas. Such production of 
knowledge calls for special tools of 
knowledge management, such as 
monitoring of knowledge flow, in the 
same way that the flow of capital or 
raw materials in a company need 
managing. Customer-relations man-
agement is also transformed into cus-
tomer-knowledge management (Gib-
bert 2002) as a new knowledge-
sharing process, focused on customer 
success rather than customer satisfac-
tion. The main share of company 
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value is attributed to intellectual 
property and companies should be 
devising strategies for managing their 
intangible assets.  
The changing value of knowledge 
has also changed the means of technol-
ogy transfer and the institutions involved 
in it. The traditional model, in which 
technology moves from one well-defined 
economic unit to another, has given way 
to complex process (Amesse and Cohen-
det 2001) resulting in special knowledge-
sharing platforms, such as the technology 
clinics in Finland (Autio and Wicksteed 
1998) or cooperative research centres in 
Hungary (Buzás 2002). Market players 
with significant knowledge need to access 
complementary forms of knowledge from 
other players if they are to use their in-
ternal knowledge with maximum effi-
ciency. Such knowledge-sharing networks 
also reduce the risk of overspecialization. 
A functional description of the 
knowledge-based economy and the 
managerial approach to its development 
yields the following main features: 
* The technology and knowledge are the 
main factors of production. 
* The intangible assets are the primary 
subjects to manage. 
* Networks are characterized as knowl-
edge-based partnership with constant 
trade-off, through by the accession of 
the complementary forms of knowl-
edge. 
2) CHANGING NATURE OF 
PRODUCTION FACTORS IN A 
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 
The impact of information and communi-
cation technology (ICT) on economic 
growth is commonly considered the main 
impetus behind the new economy. Such 
technology also brings organizational 
change and larger-scale changes in soci-
ety. ICT plays a crucial role in knowl-
edge production: 
* It enhances the productivity of R and 
D, by increasing the codification of 
knowledge and digital communication 
between researchers. 
* It promotes the diffusion of knowl-
edge, through digital transparency. 
* It increases the rate of return on 
‘learning’, through digital forms of 
education. 
* There are three laws that describe the 
expansion of ICT quantitatively (Gilder 
1996). Moore’s Law holds that the 
upper limit on the processing power 
of microchips at a given price doubles 
about every 18 months. According to 
the Gilder’s law, the total bandwidth 
of communication systems triples every 
12 months. Finally, Metcalfe’s law 
states that the value of a network is 
proportional to the square of the 
number of nodes. The emergence of 
the knowledge-based economy is prin-
cipally affected by these laws because 
the quality and penetration of ICT 
equipment and services determine the 
effectiveness of knowledge transfer 
and sharing processes. 
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The unusual expansion of the ICT 
sector has been associated with an ex-
tremely high, sustained rate of investment 
in it (OECD 2000), which can be ex-
plained by its strong impact on produc-
tivity. The unit cost of computers has 
dropped dramatically in recent decades. 
This has been associated with key Inter-
net advances, including the development 
of HTML in 1989 and of the first 
browser, Mosaic, in 1993. These were 
huge contributions towards enlarging the 
potential of ICT and, for instance, to the 
development of the new industry of e-
commerce.  
To gain a better insight into ICT in 
Hungary, the telecom (CT) and computer 
(IT) sector must be studied separately. 
Hungary under the former political re-
gime had been extremely backward tele-
phone service, for political and financial, 
rather than technological reasons. On the 
other hand, the delayed demand for 
telecommunications was very high, as the 
present rate of mobile phone users (65 
per cent in 2002) makes clear (Szent-
györgyi 2003). Hungary now has a lib-
eralized telecommunications system, with 
several fixed-line and three mobile tele-
phone companies providing a good level 
of telecom density. The total spending in 
the telecom sector has reached an an-
nual EUR 2.3 billion, of which tele-
com services account for 80 per 
cent (Dömölki 2002). 
Unfortunately, the IT charac-
teristics are not as impressive. In 
2000, there were 8.6 home com-
puters installed per 100 inhabitants 
and non-business access to the 
Internet was confined to 7.1 per 
cent of population. By the end of 
2000, the number of Internet hosts 
had reached 105,000 and there were 
45,000 .hu domains registered. These 
figures area bout a third of the Euro-
pean average (Table 1). The service mar-
ket accounts for only 30 per cent of the 
total computer market of EUR 1.3 billion, 
which means that the proportions are the 
opposite of those in the telecom sector.  
Table 1 shows that Hungary holds 
a much worse position in ICT penetra-
tion than the smaller economies of the 
EU, although it is not far behind Portu-
gal. Even the major difference in the 
number of mobile phone subscribers had 
been eliminated by the end of 2002. Of 
the ‘advance party’ of countries joining 
the EU in 2004, Hungary lies between 
Poland and Czech Republic for each 
variable.  
The weak penetration of home 
computers in Hungary was considerably 
influenced by high local telephone 
charges, which are the main factor costs 
for households and small business enti-
ties, representing two-thirds of the cost 
of accessing the Internet at off-peak 
hours. Intensive Internet access via tele-
phone lines, if priced at voice rates, be-
comes extremely expensive. Liberalization 
has brought a decrease in telecom 
prices, as have new technologies (cable 
TV and ADSL). 
 
Table 1
Information-society measures for selected European coun-
tries, 2000, units per 100 inhabitants 
 
 Personal 
computers
Internet 
hosts 
Internet 
users 
Mobile phone 
subscribers 
EU 15 28.6 2.9 26.3 62.6 
Ireland 36.0 2.3 27.5 66.8 
Belgium 34.2 3.5 28.3 54.9 
Portugal 10.5 1.2 10.0 66.5 
Czech Republic 13.0 1.6 9.7 42.2 
Poland 6.9 0.9 7.2 17.5 
Hungary 8.6 1.0 7.1 29.6 
Source: Eurostat Yearbook, 2002.
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To catch up in ICT and create a 
supportive ICT environment for the 
knowledge-based economy, a Government 
Commissioner for Information Technology 
(GCIT) was appointed in the summer of 
2000, working within the Prime Minis-
ter’s Office. The commissioner is respon-
sible for the development and application 
of IT in public administration, and for 
coordinating all governmental efforts at 
ICT regulation. The development of a 
‘Strategy of the National Information So-
ciety’ (NISS) was designated a principal 
task. The tasks of e-government were 
summarized in a separate Electronic 
Government Programme. Elaboration of a 
strategy is also formulated as a separate 
chapter in a medium-term economic de-
velopment projection (the Széchenyi Plan), 
with a budget of EUR 160 million for 
the first two years of implementation. 
The rapid change in ICT prevents the 
development of a conventional mid-term 
strategy, so that the preliminary docu-
ment of the NISS, covering a 3–5-year 
initial period, is revised based on annual 
estimates. 
Considering the ICT lags that must 
be eliminated as soon as possible, the 
NISS defined seven programmes, imple-
menting a joint ‘Man-Instrument-Content’ 
rule, aimed at promoting the develop-
ment of skills, enhancing accessibility, 
and cutting prices on the national mar-
ket (NIT 2001). The ‘Sulinet’ Programme 
for schools was launched in 1996. Its 
aim of providing direct Internet access 
to every Hungarian secondary school 
was extended by the Strategy to primary 
schools, with a deadline of 2002. The 
administration provided access to ICT 
devices to key knowledge multiplier enti-
ties (e.g. schoolteachers, public service 
employees), through a tendering system. 
In the field of Internet services and tele-
communications, a minimum service has 
been defined, which has intensified com-
petition in the Internet access market.  
Under the Széchenyi Plan, the GCIT 
Office called for 15 different tenders for 
adapting international experience, main-
taining and publishing databases, pro-
moting the infrastructure of voluntary 
organizations, supporting contents in the 
Hungarian language, and promoting ini-
tiatives on scientific topics related to in-
formation-society build-up (Széchenyi 
2000). More than 3500 applications had 
been granted by 2002. 
3) THE SPREAD OF ICT 
TECHNOLOGY AND ITS IMPACT 
ON THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED 
STRUCTURE 
The spread of ICT technology throughout 
manufacturing industry has clearly al-
tered the demands made of machinery 
and of the labour force. The nature and 
scope of codified knowledge in the pro-
duction process has also changed. The 
Taylorist principles of scientific manage-
ment – the main carriers of the first 
major spread of codified knowledge – 
only affected production areas slightly. 
The production flow could not continue 
without the discretionary activity of 
skilled workers. ICT technology, notably 
electronic automation technologies and 
remote sensing devices, has led to a fur-
ther reduction in skilled and manual 
work in manufacturing. This process re-
duces the overall role of skilled workers 
possessing tacit knowledge and alters the 
content of that tacit knowledge. There 
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have been changes in the qualities re-
quired of the labour force, in under-
standing and implementing codified 
knowledge and in the nature and use of 
tacit knowledge.  
The set of knowledge required to 
carry out production is partly embedded 
in codified routines and includes tacit 
knowledge of workers acquired through 
experience. Codified knowledge,1 as in-
formation, is defined as a message con-
taining structured data imparted by the 
cognitive context of the receiver. Knowl-
edge is this entire cognitive context, an 
attribute of individual agents. Humans 
also possess knowledge not acquired as 
information, which is not reduced to 
symbolic representations (or codes), and 
is held in forms that are not readily 
available for communication to others. 
This type of knowledge is tacit knowl-
edge. A main point at issue is the extent 
of the potential for codification of 
knowledge. Codification is the process by 
which modifiable tacit knowledge is 
transformed into and replaced by codi-
fied procedures and information or rou-
tines.  
Taylorist work organization carried 
out the codification of production knowl-
edge previously held by workers, by 
clearly articulating and subdividing it 
into elementary tasks easily transmissible 
via operational protocols. Control of 
knowledge was thus transferred from the 
heads of skilled workers to the produc-
tion management and individual skills 
transformed into organizational compe-
tencies in coordination routines. The 
method was mainly applied to operations 
consisting of a set of simple, repetitive 
decomposable acts. Such rationalization 
                                                 
1 The definition is based on Cowan, David and 
Foray 2000. 
brought marked increases in productivity, 
especially with products whose final as-
sembly constituted a crucial act. But 
many operations in the processing phases 
relied inherently upon specific cognitive 
competencies – tacit knowledge acquired 
by skilled workers through experience. 
Codifying this tacit knowledge and mak-
ing these activities routine2 could only be 
done by deploying technologies capable 
of measuring the physical phenomena 
that skilled workers were used to sen-
sory evaluation, and controlling and 
guiding devices that substituted for hu-
man judgement and action.  
All manufacturing today is being 
reshaped by computer-based automation, 
for assembly is also affected, though at 
a much slower pace than processing. In 
fact, manipulations accomplished simply 
by humans are often difficult by robots, 
so that the cost of automated assembly 
can still often outweigh the benefits. The 
tasks assigned to operatives on the rare 
computerized assembly lines have become 
similar to those performed on processing 
lines. The main role of operatives is to 
monitor and control the actions of intel-
ligent machines that are fully freed from 
direct human intervention. Since various 
anomalies may occur, operatives act 
mainly as problem-solvers and no longer 
participate in physical manipulation of 
materials. Moreover, the rapid changes 
in products bring successive new prob-
lems.  
Another important feature of the 
new technology is that formalization of 
                                                 
2 Routines play an important role in the behav-
ioural approaches of firm theory. Management 
decisions and technology decisions are based in 
day-to-day contexts on repetitive routines, while 
strategic decisions are supplemented by a con-
tinuous search for innovation. The best known 
description of this approach is provided by Nel-
son and Winter 1982. 
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the technological process opens the way 
to continuously improving it. Although 
the scientific laws behind the technologies 
are not always understood, modelling 
physical processes helps to introduce im-
provements. This contrasts with the pre-
vious practice on the tacit, opaque 
knowledge in the heads of the operatives. 
A further important feature is the use of 
computers in design of activity (CAD). 
CAD makes it easier to standardize the 
components of objects to be designed 
and retrieve existing solutions. In this 
way, it enhances concentration of efforts 
on true innovations, and so lowers the 
cost and increases the speed of innova-
tion, which is crucial in market competi-
tion. A rising proportion of employees 
are engaged in problem-solving tasks to 
do with designing products, planning 
their manufacture and bringing them to 
the marketplace. The crucial role of 
problem-solving shows that codification of 
technological knowledge does not abso-
lutely imply that tacit human knowledge 
has ceased to be important.3  
The first step in codification in the 
knowledge-based economic system was a 
collective enterprise, made possible by the 
increasing availability at low cost of 
measuring instruments and computers, 
which provided the quantitative data to 
be organized into models and the com-
putation ability to run models and simu-
lations. While the code collections are in 
use, they continually change and im-
prove. Long-term evolution is carried out 
by innovative firms: equipment suppliers 
and users, universities and research 
teams. The various actors gain benefits 
from doing the codification process. The 
                                                 
3 Balconi 2002 provides thorough analysis of 
change in the tacit knowledge required in manu-
facturing, based on extensive field research in 
manufacturing industries. 
main benefits of specific codified proce-
dures stem from the chance to use 
automated manufacturing technologies. 
This allows firms to achieve perfect repe-
tition of the processes and levels of pro-
ductivity and precision that would be 
impossible simply with human capabilities. 
The throughput of innovation activities is 
enhanced by using easily retrievable da-
tabases and automated design and re-
search technologies.  
Codification has fixed costs: the 
codification cost is the same regardless 
of the scale of production. So there are 
increasing returns from codification and 
its profitability relates to the intensity 
with which the codified information is 
used. Small firms may therefore find 
codification uneconomic and prefer to 
rely on the tacit knowledge of their em-
ployees. However, once a firm has codi-
fied its know-how, it possesses a re-
source that can be used at no additional 
cost and shows no decline in return. A 
multi-plant producer may gain a consid-
erable competitive advantage over one 
with a single plant, since it incurs no 
extra cost with further codification or 
from hiring the tacit knowledge of 
workers at the additional plants. Trans-
nationals (TNCs) operating in Hungary 
immediately started utilizing codified 
knowledge. Most Hungarian-owned com-
panies, on the other hand, do not pos-
sess the means to implement codification. 
Their strategy does not usually include 
mass investment in integrated ICT pro-
duction facilities. The usual argument is 
that for the time being, the tacit knowl-
edge of skilled employees coupled with 
traditional equipment can produce the 
same quantity and quality of output. This 
argument certainly presupposes limited 
production series and reflects a serious 
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shortage of capital to invest in knowl-
edge codification.  
Since at least some technological 
knowledge is product specific, the cost 
of codification increases with product 
differentiation. So firms specializing in 
customized products rely less on codified 
procedures and specifications than firms 
producing more standardized goods. This 
argument underlines the important sec-
tor-specific aspects of the potential bene-
fits of knowledge codification. As long as 
there is a market for customized goods, 
there will also be room for actors utiliz-
ing tacit, instead of codified knowledge. 
Mass customization – the use of ICT for 
mass production of goods available in 
several versions may – further limits the 
chances of tacit-knowledge-based firms to 
find market niches that escape codified-
knowledge-based production.  
In general, codification of technical 
knowledge has brought deep changes in 
the types of skills required to carry out 
manufacturing activity. Tacit skills made 
obsolete due by codified know-how are 
those that rely on sensory perception and 
manual skills. Acquiring these calls for 
imitation of a master by an apprentice 
and long-lasting practical applications 
and experience, but no formal educa-
tion.4 They cannot be transferred by 
simple symbolic communication, as the 
rules to follow are not precisely known. 
Two types of ability are required: ability 
to evaluate physical phenomena based on 
sensory perception and manual dexterity 
at various levels. These skills mark 
craftsmen, skilled workers indispensable 
to the production process, who conduct 
                                                 
4 Balconi 2002 provides much anecdotal evidence 
of the specific nature of transferring tacit knowl-
edge. For a full description of the process, see 
Rosenberg 1976. 
operations based on non-codified knowl-
edge. The age of such skilled workers 
began to decline as their tacit knowledge 
was codified and execution of their ac-
tivity assigned to a machine or instru-
ment, or a technological innovation was 
made that changed the production proc-
ess and made their specific knowledge 
obsolete. While some functions and jobs 
based on tacit skills still exist, the trend 
towards eliminating them is clear.  
The tacit skills that complement 
codified and automated manufacturing 
process are heuristic and interpretative 
skills that serve to decode and assign 
meaning to information-bearing messages 
(structured data inputs and codified 
know-how) and to create innovations.5 
They are based on new types of inher-
ently tacit knowledge. They presuppose a 
basis of formal education and develop 
through experience. Several abilities are 
required in different sequences of the 
production/marketing process. The first 
is enhanced analytical capability of 
evaluating codified information, recogniz-
ing underlying drifts from weak signals, 
drawing not easily predictable conclu-
sions from known data and establishing 
unexpected correlations among variables. 
Problem solving ability to work out im-
provements to known solutions is used 
for instance in the case of machinery 
breakdowns. There is an increasing need 
for capability to draw interpretations of 
qualitative nature, for example an inter-
pretation of changing consumer tastes. 
These new categories of tacit skills rely 
based on pattern matching. Humans have 
an advantage over computers in situa-
tions that need to be addressed through 
a method of pattern matching instead of 
                                                 
5 Descriptions and uses of new types of skills 
can be found in several articles by various au-
thors. The account here relies on Balconi 2002. 
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computing. This is clear for example in 
the activity of creating novelties or con-
trolling production process depending on 
imperfectly known interplay of many 
variables and circumstances.  
The task of interpreting codified in-
formation n the shop floor is assigned to 
operators who monitor and control 
automated processes, as supervisory con-
trollers of computer-managed machines 
that execute the production process. They 
must promptly face the anomalies that 
hinder the correct functioning of ma-
chines and quickly intervene when the 
information shown on computer displays 
reveal that some problem emerged. The 
reasons underlying deviations from pre-
scribed operation procedures may be 
numerous, the more this is so the higher 
the number of variables that come into 
play in relation to the complexity of the 
process. The task of interpreting avail-
able information in order to keep vari-
ances under control calls for the exer-
tion of judgement. The seriousness of the 
anomaly must be evaluated by the op-
erator in order to decide whether the 
case is one that requires him to request 
the help of a specialist or whether his 
problem solving capability may suffice.  
The emerging new technological 
paradigm does not diffuse immediately at 
all levels and everywhere, one may still 
find very different work situations in the 
same sector or even in various depart-
ments of the same firm, where the two 
types of workers coexist. Current super-
visory controllers must have a higher 
level of formal education than old 
craftsmen, in order to interact with 
computers and to have some understand-
ing of the technological process they su-
pervise must. However, crucial part of 
their competence (problem solving) is 
also based on experience and insight, 
and is enhanced by process innovation. 
Controllers’ knowledge is more general 
and can be redeployed across various 
sectors after some retraining, whereas 
the knowledge of craftsmen was ex-
tremely sector-specific. The takeover of 
physical tasks by machinery and the 
higher level of education of operators 
widened the scope of their responsibility. 
They are generally responsible for quality 
and carry out preventive maintenance. 
Specialists are assigned the most sophisti-
cated maintenance operations.  
Adoption of innovative computer-
based technologies and inclusion of 
automation into traditional technologies 
have had the effect of increasing capital 
intensity. Unskilled workers performing 
repetitive tasks not calling for the appli-
cation of knowledge have usually been 
displaced. The operations that have re-
mained manually performed in the main 
are loading, moving and unloading. 
However, some branches are still little 
affected by these changes, and much of 
their activity is still manual. Such areas 
include certain phases of various produc-
tion processes, for example the assembly 
phase in most sectors.  
In the new setting, increasing im-
portance attaches to creating new oper-
ating practices, to exploit fully the po-
tentials of new complex pieces of equip-
ment to produce a wide range of prod-
ucts and to obtain a high level of qual-
ity. This is not the task of technical per-
sonnel assisting production, not manag-
ers. The result is proprietary knowledge 
taking the form of specific codified 
know-how expressed, for example, in 
some kind of software. Thus, learning by 
doing and learning by using become the 
planned activity of technical personnel, 
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who supplement researchers in corporate 
laboratories and contribute to creating 
proprietary knowledge assets that are the 
basic source of a firm’s competitive ad-
vantage.  
In general, tacit competencies have 
lost ground since the previous, Taylorist 
model. They have also changed charac-
ter, in most cases to something comple-
mentary to a codified content. However, 
they remain crucial, so that the per-
formance and survival of firms still de-
pend on individual workers’ ability to 
solve problems, control and improve 
processes, find new technical solutions, 
design new products, develop relations 
with clients and interpret market trends. 
While the product of searching in the 
technological field is now codified knowl-
edge, the actual process of searching 
and creating new artefacts (innovative 
efforts) remains embodied in individuals. 
This contrasts with the previous situation, 
where production processes relied largely 
on craft knowledge; technological knowl-
edge did not exist as a structured set of 
information and rules. The tacit compe-
tence of problem-solvers, complementing 
the explicit knowledge mastered by them 
and acquired from a formal education, 
is a dynamic capability, instrumental to 
carrying out the tasks of continuously 
producing new products and learning 
new things.  
The changing pattern of employ-
ment in manufacturing changes the types 
of skills and education required. These 
generally include a basic technical educa-
tion, except for workers still engaged in 
manual operations such as easy assembly 
or loading and unloading. In engineer-
ing, for example, unskilled workers 
move objects that machines have trans-
formed, having been set up and con-
trolled by skilled workers, who also 
monitor product quality, while specialist 
problem-solvers intervene as required. A 
growing proportion of overall working 
time is spent on innovations, organizing 
the introduction of them, and optimizing 
the production cycle, with the aid of 
computers.  
4) THE SPREAD OF ICT US-
AGE AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
CHANGES 
Codification of technological practices 
and the use of ICT, together with the 
accelerated pace of innovation, have sig-
nificantly affected the decisions of firms 
about their boundaries and led them to-
wards vertical disintegration.6 In general, 
firms feel the need to change the cost 
structure by transforming rising fixed 
costs into variable costs. Outsourcing re-
duces risks and increases flexibility, so 
that sales can be increased at lower in-
vestment cost. Given the accelerating rate 
of innovation in all fields, firms applying 
technological knowledge need to narrow 
their field of activity to a limited set of 
increasingly complex core activities. To 
these they may allocate scarce resources, 
so developing distinctive competencies on 
which they can rely to maximize profits. 
Investment becomes concentrated on stra-
tegic functions (e.g. R and D and mar-
keting) and on manufacturing phases 
where proprietary know-how offers a 
competitive edge, or where feedback 
from research laboratories is particularly 
                                                 
6 For a concise description of the general reasons 
for vertical disintegration, see Hamel and Praha-
lad 1992. 
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important. Specialized suppliers selling to 
a number of clients have an incentive to 
invest in specialized equipment and 
knowledge that permit optimal batch 
sizes and minimize production costs. 
Outsourcing may also yield big external 
economies of scale for the whole produc-
tion process. Integrated firms may be-
come active supporters of the spin-offs 
and start-ups of highly competitive spe-
cialized suppliers.  
Codification of technological knowl-
edge and the spread of ICT have facili-
tated the process of vertical disintegra-
tion in various ways. The rationalization 
facilitated by computers and the concept 
of components have led to standard 
families of non-firm-specific products that 
can be produced on a large scale and 
sold to large numbers of buyers. This 
also permits firms to break up tasks 
that used to be perceived as a complete 
process of problem-solving and produc-
tion. The convergence of firms operating 
in a given technological context, based 
on certain codified patterns of definition 
of given sub-problems, have allowed the 
global problem-solving task to decompose 
and spurred the emergence of actors 
specialized in the various sub-tasks.  
Codification and ICT also help di-
rectly to reduce transaction costs. The 
evolution of a common language among 
market actors and the habit of codifica-
tion help customers to define their re-
quirements more precisely. They may 
provide suppliers not just with detailed 
specifications, but with codified proce-
dures for the production process. This 
also enhances the precision and quality 
of the product supplied. For example, 
numerically controlled equipment in met-
alworking allows component producers 
to make products with tolerances within 
microns, so that they are practically per-
fect for most applications. 
There is a decline in the specificity 
of various resources, components, 
equipment and human capital. The new 
concept of components as autonomous 
products, not specific to a particular use 
and available from flexible means of 
production suitable for a whole family of 
similar components, has helped to reduce 
the specificity of resources and so cut 
transaction costs. Standardization of 
components allows customers to avoid 
being dependent on a single supplier. 
Craftsmen too were a specific human 
resource, but a firm’s dependence on 
them was easier to manage in a hierar-
chical relationship than it became in a 
market one.  
Vertical disintegration is often re-
garded as a new chance for small firms 
and small countries to take up new pat-
terns of the international division of la-
bour. However, there are various pat-
terns of outsourcing. The technology-
based cooperation just described and the 
creation of specialized spin-offs and 
start-ups assume an adequate level of 
technology and skills, as well as capital 
to invest in highly specialized equipment 
suitable for mass batch production of 
specialized components. Want of any of 
these factors may lead to different coop-
eration patterns and the dominant pat-
terns in Hungary vary according to the 
availability of such inputs. A growing 
number of foreign-owned firms, and 
even some Hungarian ones, may still be 
capable of deploying such highly special-
ized equipment and recruiting a labour 
force that possesses the new qualities of 
tacit knowledge. Such firms may still 
struggle with capacity utilization prob-
lems, as many TNC customers effectively 
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block their suppliers from selling to 
competitors.  
On the other hand, the various 
reasons for vertical disintegration offer 
opportunities for cooperation at lower 
levels of technological sophistication. 
These patterns too are greatly enhanced 
by transfers of tacit knowledge. Subcon-
tracting, for example, became wide-
spread in the Hungarian economy be-
cause suppliers possessed the necessary 
equipment and expertise for ‘breaking 
the codes’ of codified knowledge. This 
does not mean, however, that they use 
highly specialized equipment. On the con-
trary, they use old equipment and rely 
on tacit craft knowledge as a substitute 
for automated equipment. It is obvious 
that this kind of substitution is possible 
only until transaction costs are pushed 
up to a prohibitive level by increasing 
wage costs. 
Vertical disintegration and subse-
quent outsourcing may occur on an in-
ternational level. The following section 
looks at task mobility in the light of the 
changed character of the knowledge 
used in the production process.  
5) IMPACTS ON THE DIVISION 
OF LABOUR: TASK MOBILITY 
IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION 
SOCIETY 
The emerging global information society 
is generally assumed to have two main 
features: materials replace information as 
the key economic input, and there is a 
concurrent shift in the economic process 
from passive information to active 
knowledge and the use of analytical in-
formation skills. These features are usu-
ally bracketed with de-industrialization of 
the developed economies, which is the 
subject of a massive body of literature 
dating back to the early 1980s. In an 
era of global economic organization, 
movement of material goods becomes less 
important than flows of information and 
knowledge. An idealized picture shows 
developed economies becoming ‘weight-
less’ – no longer dependent on produc-
tion industries. Others take the view that 
industry still ‘matters’ – an abrupt 
change in the structure and characteris-
tics of industries is perceived rather than 
elimination of industry. In fact, there is 
statistical evidence that the GDP share of 
manufacturing ceased to decline in most 
developed economies in the late 1990s. 
However, the de-industrialization process 
has big implications for the organization 
of economic activities and the global di-
vision of labour. 
The later stages of the process can 
be seen as a shift from a firm-specific, 
geographically contained, technical divi-
sion of labour to one that is spatially 
more fragmented. Previously, certain in-
formation or knowledge tasks were un-
dertaken within the manufacturing enter-
prise. The spread of outsourcing, with 
the emergence of specialist providers, has 
given rise to whole new industries 
around specific industrial functions. 
Competition in manufacturing and ser-
vices oblige firms to look for ways to 
reduce costs and improve efficiency. One 
strategy is to focus on core business and 
contract out some services. This spread 
of contracting out has contributed by 
definition to a declining share of manu-
facturing and an increase in the tertiary 
sector, although the combined industrial 
output may have remained stable or 
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even increased. Tasks that used to be 
included in the statistics under manufac-
turing are now re-coded as services. Re-
classification in itself is not a revolution-
ary change in production. However, the 
process has great importance, as tasks 
regarded as information-related, when no 
longer tied to a location, potentially be-
come internationally ‘footloose’. 
A parallel process in the interna-
tional division of labour has been the 
movement of much low-skill, highly la-
bour-intensive manufacturing to areas 
with lower labour costs. This major shift 
has been encouraged by a relative de-
cline in shipping costs and fewer barri-
ers to international trade. Nevertheless, 
control of the transferred activities re-
mains with the multinationals based in 
the developed states.7 This is also appar-
ent in the rapidly increasing share of 
intra-firm turnover in world trade. Since 
much manufacturing takes place else-
where, some of the workforce in devel-
oped states face a choice between unem-
ployment or work in the services. This 
kind of employment impact is somewhat 
different from what was previously at-
tributed to technological change. The la-
bour-saving effects of technological de-
velopment have always been recognized, 
but now there is also a labour-diversion 
effect – movement of jobs to low-cost 
locations.  
Empirical evidence supports the 
conclusion that the diffusion of informa-
tion and communication technologies 
                                                 
7 Technical conditions for wider international 
production networks were created with by four 
innovations: (i) the spread of ICT in corporate 
management, allowing firms to organize and 
control cross-border activities, (ii) innovations in 
goods and passenger transport (jet airliners, con-
tainer shipments), (iii) flat M-shaped corporate 
organization charts, facilitating decentralized deci-
sion-making, and (iv) ICT in production, facilitat-
ing international sequencing.  
helps to create jobs to compensate for 
the job losses. This job creation is as-
sumed to take place mainly in the ser-
vice sector and is hardly threatened by 
foreign producers. As the nature of em-
ployment in developed economies 
changes, their workforces continue to 
benefit from proximity to the most de-
veloped markets and from the non-
tradable nature of most services. The 
common presumption about services is 
that emerging market economies are ex-
porters to more developed regions only 
of unskilled, labour-intensive services, 
while developed economies specialize in 
skill-intensive activities. Typical services to 
make intensive use of unskilled labour 
are shipping, tourism and construction 
services. However, there was also a shift 
in the 1990s into certain semi-skilled in-
formation tasks (e.g. data processing). 
The adoption of the Trade-Related Intel-
lectual Property Rights agreement (TRIPs) 
by the WTO has widened and harmo-
nized the legal regime governing protec-
tion of intellectual property. This 
stronger legal protection has reassured 
information owners that their data and 
other knowledge resources will be safe 
from infringement in the global system. 
The international exchange of information 
is now as robust as the exchange of 
other forms of property: a precondition 
for swift expansion of international data 
circulation. A complex division of labour 
has started to emerge in the core indus-
tries of a global information society.  
The emergence of cross-border in-
formation service networks has laid some 
labour, managerial and information tasks 
open to pressures hitherto found mainly 
in manual occupations. International task 
mobility used to concern transfers of 
low-skilled employment to low-cost loca-
tions. The transfer of knowledge tasks is 
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even more mobile internationally, since its 
deployment to low-cost locations does not 
require large-scale investment in produc-
tion facilities or costly transportation in-
frastructure. Knowledge tasks mediated 
through electronic networks call for little 
of this specialist preparation. While it 
may take some time for a location to 
become a site for inward task migration 
of physical manufacturing, the require-
ments for offshore supply of a consider-
able proportion of knowledge work are 
simply a telephone line and a PC. The 
other key element is an educated work-
force with computer skills and adequate 
knowledge of the requisite language 
(typically English), as well as an ability 
to learn how to manipulate data.  
The emerging pattern in the inter-
national division of labour for services is 
also transferring to emerging economies 
certain traditional low-skill occupations 
(personal services, construction, etc.) that 
form a growing part of business ser-
vices. Business services auxiliary to the 
circulation of goods through international 
production chains have so far been con-
centrated in the developed industrial 
states. Now they are becoming open re-
mote providers competing on cost and 
quality. Retail and personal financial ser-
vices have begun to move towards elec-
tronic provision. Banks, for example, in-
creasingly offer online services, while 
mail-order retailing is starting to global-
ize through the Internet. Business services 
often take the character of information 
processing (back-office activities) that 
does not call for proximity to the actual 
service interface. Data processing is also 
being moved to low-cost locations by the 
insurance and airline industries. The 
most extensive globalization of service 
provision has been in the financial-
services markets. Once these back-office 
functions have been separated geographi-
cally from their originating sites, there 
remains little to keep them in the same 
state or region. Overnight processing 
may be done better and faster overnight 
on the other side of the globe. This mi-
gration of back-office tasks is boosted by 
better protection of intellectual property 
under the WTO TRIPs agreement and 
greater reliability in data imaging and 
handling technologies. 
The effect of improving technical 
conditions for transferring service tasks 
is enhanced by better reception condi-
tions in several emerging economies, 
thanks to rapid technical modernization 
and efforts to improve educational stan-
dards in many developing and transition 
economies. The two areas seemingly most 
likely to be affected by the employment 
of offshore facilities are professional and 
technical tasks, where technical knowl-
edge is brought to bear on a specific 
problem, with little direct physical con-
tact with clients (engineers, program-
mers, analysts), and clerical jobs (data 
entry, record keeping, etc.) An important 
factor behind the relocation of many 
MNC jobs from developed to developing 
countries has been the rapidly rising 
quality of the workforce in many coun-
tries, such as China, Brazil and India.8 
Turning to Hungary’s position in 
the migration of service tasks, the coun-
try takes part in both the high and low 
ends of the business. Qualified engineer-
ing tasks and programming used to be 
a key area of specialization for many 
Hungarian software firms. On the other 
hand, data processing on a mass scale is 
                                                 
8 May 2000 provides a good description of the 
evolving Indian software industry and how it 
provides back-office services and performs simple 
programming tasks. 
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also carried out. Hungary’s competitive 
positions in the IT services markets 
seems to be changing. The low-end ac-
tivities are seriously threatened by the 
developments in competing countries in 
the Third World, as Hungarian wage 
costs no longer match them. These tasks 
can be transferred rapidly to less expen-
sive locations as it requires little material 
effort to do so. In the longer run, Hun-
gary may be able to retain only the bet-
ter-qualified jobs. The loss of low-skill 
occupations in IT services creates similar 
problems to those caused by job destruc-
tion in other low-skill branches. There is 
a popular assumption that unemployment 
in the segment can be eliminated 
through better and more accessible edu-
cation, but this could be a long process, 
even according to an optimistic scenario.  
Employment tensions may hit the 
developed countries even harder. The 
information society destroys more jobs 
than it creates, since its effects on cur-
rent work practices outweigh the in-
crease in jobs in the new industries. 
Productivity rises affect the remaining 
jobs, leading to a net loss of employ-
ment, despite the emergence of new in-
formation industries and services. One 
conceivable way to handle the problem 
would be a radical reduction in working 
hours, to spread the available work 
more evenly among the available work-
force. The effects of improvements in 
education on employment may be mixed, 
especially for unskilled labour. Possession 
of basic skills in handling ICT-related 
equipment would facilitate the retraining 
of the labour force for jobs that are 
currently moving out of Hungary to 
lower-cost locations.  
6) POLICY ASPECTS OF A 
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 
An OECD definition describes the knowl-
edge-based economy as one directly 
based on the production, distribution and 
utilization of knowledge and informa-
tion.9 Interpreters of this and other defi-
nitions usually emphasize that the knowl-
edge-based economy does not rely solely 
on a few high technology industries for 
growth and wealth production. Several 
authors regard this new economic system 
as an evolving technological paradigm10 
or trajectory,11 directing the development 
of the whole economy, not just the 
branches that produce the equipment to 
diffuse and integrate it. This is often re-
garded as the backbone of a new 
Kondratieff cycle. The essence and driv-
ing force of the new paradigm is crea-
tion and use of knowledge facilitated by 
specialized ICT devices. 
An OECD paper concludes that 
support for long-term growth in the 
knowledge-based economy should concen-
trate on ICT production and deployment, 
human capital development, innovation 
and firm creation. Differences in growth 
between OECD countries are attributed 
mainly to different levels of investment in 
ICT, to the use and quality of labour, 
and to efficiency in combining labour 
and capital.12 In successful economies, 
entrepreneurial behaviour is encouraged 
                                                 
9 OECD 1996. 
10 Dosi 1982. 
11 Teece 1988. 
12 OECD 2001. 
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by a competitive environment, an effi-
cient labour market, and a legal and 
financial environment that protects intel-
lectual property and supports start-up 
firms. Furthermore, productivity in the 
ICT sector improves overall economic 
productivity, while ICT-facilitated innova-
tion increases labour productivity. Suc-
cessful economies are the most likely to 
experience rapid spread of ICT, particu-
larly in the service industries.  
The importance of human capital in 
innovation underlies the demand for in-
creased skills, including teamwork and 
cognitive skills, and lifelong learning to 
allow continual adaptation to change. 
The impact that knowledge accumulation 
is seen to have on productivity under-
lines the importance of adequate educa-
tion systems, with their spillover effects 
on society. Investment in the knowledge 
base means support for the science sec-
tor and R and D, to take full advantage 
of new technologies. The innovation 
process and the pace at which new 
technologies spread are increased by the 
knowledge flow between individuals, 
firms and other organizations, and be-
tween national economies. Knowledge 
networks reduce the costs of R and D 
and speed up the innovation process.  
The OECD study13 draws some im-
portant policy conclusions.  
ICT is an enabling technology. Gov-
ernments should: focus policy efforts on 
increasing the use of new technology; 
increasing competition and continuing 
telecom regulatory reform to enhance the 
uptake of ICT; ensuring sufficient com-
petition in hardware and software, to 
lower costs; building confidence in the 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
use of ICT for business and consumers; 
and giving e-government priority. 
Its proposals for fostering an inno-
vative environment are to give greater 
priority to basic research; improve the 
effectiveness of government innovation 
funding; make greater use of competitive 
funding and evaluation in supporting 
public research; tackle new challenges in 
intellectual property regimes; and remove 
barriers and regulations that limit effec-
tive interaction between universities, firms 
and public laboratories.  
It advocates priority for policies to 
enhance human capital (skills and com-
petencies embodied in labour): investing 
in high-quality early education and child-
care; improving basic and vocational 
educational attainment and the quality of 
the system; easing the school-to work 
transition; strengthening links between 
higher education and the labour market 
in a cost-effective way; providing wider 
training opportunities; and reducing ob-
stacles to workplace mobility and giving 
workers a greater voice.  
It argues for an entrepreneurial 
climate: promoting access to financing; 
facilitating entry and exit by firms; re-
viewing and assessing the relevance and 
effectiveness of government support pro-
grammes; and encouraging an entrepre-
neurial spirit in society. 
The economic and social fundamen-
tals have to be in place: preserve macro-
economic stability; encourage openness; 
make financial systems more supportive 
of innovation; mobilize labour resources; 
and address the redistributive implica-
tions of structural change. 
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7) A FITTING ENVIRONMENT 
FOR A KNOWLEDGE-BASED 
ECONOMY IN HUNGARY 
 
Creating an appropriate institu-
tional environment 
In trying to define the key institutions a 
less developed country will need to pro-
vide a suitable environment for a knowl-
edge-based economy, the first thought is 
often to adapt existing institutions found 
to be effective elsewhere. These, however, 
have usually been operating in a devel-
oped economy for many years, and will 
not live up to expectations if they are 
adapted with small modifications for a 
transition economy, for instance. 
This suggests that the best way for-
ward for Hungary is not institution-
based, but obstacle-based adaptation. 
First, the economic functions of the insti-
tutions found in developed countries 
have to be revealed. When they have 
been clarified, the obstacles that impede 
the effective environment for the knowl-
edge economy and need to be overcome 
by the institutions can be identified. As 
the next step, a comparison of such ob-
stacles in developed economies and the 
internal economic background of a tran-
sition economy (such as Hungary) makes 
it possible to identify the challenges for 
the institutions of the latter. Finally, tak-
ing into account social and economic 
traditions, the optimal institutional system 
for the less developed country can be 
established. For these reasons, the fea-
tures of the institutions could differ 
strongly from the ones serving as models 
in the initial step. 
Following this train of thought, a 
comprehensive institutional survey was 
made to identify some challenges that 
Hungary has to face if it is to create 
appropriate environment for a knowl-
edge-based economy: 
* Encouraging entrepreneurial activity in 
knowledge-based industry. 
* Intensifying the knowledge flow from 
university to industry and knowledge-
sharing within a triple-helix relation-
ship (university–industry–government). 
* Increasing the proportion of private 
funding of R and D expenditures. 
* Boosting knowledge-based regional 
development and specialization. 
The missing, but essential institutional 
elements and promotion activities are 
discussed in the following sub-sections. 
Cooperative research centres: in-
creasing private money in R and 
D 
Traditional theory describes innovation as 
a linear process of consecutive phases 
starting with scientific research, followed 
by development and production, and 
ending with distribution of a product or 
technology. It has been recognized more 
recently (see OECD 1996) that innovation 
is not an immediate act. Success calls for 
interactions between actors such as aca-
demic institutions, product developers, 
sellers and consumers. These inputs and 
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this feedback produce the network char-
acteristic of the innovation process, in-
cluding, most importantly of all, coop-
eration partners. 
Under the system of central plan-
ning prevalent in Hungary before the 
economic transition, there was regular 
contractual cooperation between public 
research institutions and state-owned 
firms, which more or less assured the 
transfer of results to industry. The own-
ership structure of the economy has been 
radically altered by the transformation. 
Hungary’s early institutional development 
towards a market economy has made it 
one of the most advanced transition 
countries in this respect, with more than 
80 per cent of assets owned by the pri-
vate sector (Tihanyi and Roath 2002).  
The emerging institutions of the 
market economy included private owner-
ship, commercial banking and liberalized 
foreign trade. Priority was given to pri-
vatization, monetary policy and limiting 
government intervention. This meant that 
major industrial investors were supposed 
to finance high-risk scientific research 
projects based on long-term interests, 
instead of the state: 
* Results of research become the prop-
erty of those financing it. 
* Human resources are produced by 
using research projects as a training 
site. 
* Cost-effective research facilities are 
created by sharing them. 
The integration of private firms into 
the common research projects is of im-
portance also because the proportion of 
private funding in R and D expenditure 
is much lower than in the EU: 40 per 
cent, as opposed to about 65 per cent, 
or approaching 75 per cent in Sweden. 
Nor is this typical of all post-socialist 
countries, as the pattern in the Czech 
Republic is similar to the EU’s (Eurostat 
2002).  
Contrary to expectations, however, 
traditional bigger firms showed limited 
interest in research networks and little 
willingness to build up an R and D in-
frastructure outside the firm, for fear of 
losing control over their investment. This 
means the public sector still has to play 
a major role in creating a business envi-
ronment that can serve as a model of 
European research practice, to enable 
SMEs to retain their competitiveness after 
Hungary integrates into the EU. Such 
governmental intervention results also in 
increased integration of the academic, 
public and private sectors.  
To reinforce scientific and techno-
logical standards by integrating R and D 
capacities and activities, the R and D 
secretariat at the Hungarian Ministry of 
Education invited competitive applications 
for finance thematic cooperation research 
centres (CRCs) in 2001. The host institu-
tion had to be a university with a certi-
fied PhD programme and the criteria for 
business partners included involvement in 
the centre’s activities. For ‘seed capital’, 
the government granted half the budget 
for the first three years, in a range of 
USD 0.2–1 million. Centres have to de-
velop a cooperative way of doing busi-
ness and yield returns to cover the burn 
rate of the CRC at least for the first 3–
6 years. 
This government intervention 
changed the approach of private compa-
nies immediately. For one thing, the 
frame guarantees within the organization 
(votes on the CRC board) mean the pro-
ject can be influenced directly by all 
partners. The private companies have 
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benefited from various cost-based advan-
tages. They have access to low-cost uni-
versity facilities and PhD students sup-
ported by state scholarships, as a well-
trained human resource. On some occa-
sions, private companies can use ‘no-cost’ 
facilities in universities or other public 
institutions (e.g. hospitals). Moreover, co-
operative research qualifies for special 
tax relief. 
Five CRCs have been established in 
the first round. 
The Trans-University Centre for 
Telecommunications and Informatics in 
Budapest was established by three de-
partments of two universities. The corpo-
rate partners include Hungarian subsidi-
aries of multinational informatics compa-
nies (Ericsson, Compaq and Sun) and 
Westel, the market leader in Hungarian 
mobile communications. The main pur-
pose is to develop Internet-based and 
mobile communication systems for the 
21st century. 
The CRC on Industrial and Medical 
Application of Lasers was set up in 
Southern Transdanubia by five partners 
from the academic sector in association 
with 13 private companies. The research 
centre, headquartered in Pécs, draws on 
more than local knowledge, because the 
academic and private partners both in-
clude expertise groups in laser technol-
ogy located in Budapest and Szeged as 
well. 
The University of Miskolc and 30 
industrial partners lie behind the CRC on 
Mechatronics and Material Science. This 
has the widest geographical spread of 
the five CRCs, as it includes a steel com-
pany in Dunaújváros or subsidiaries of 
the household-appliance firm Electrolux 
in Jászberény. 
The CRC on Rational Drug Design, 
based in Budapest, consists of two aca-
demic, one non-profit and four private 
pharmaceutical and biotech partners, as 
well as ten 10 university [???] depart-
ments as associated partners. The last 
have made no financial contribution, but 
make their knowledge freely available. 
The CRC for Chemical Industrial 
Development Based on Green Technolo-
gies, was established in Veszprém by the 
Institute of Chemical Engineering of 
Veszprém University, the main Hungarian 
oil company (Mol Rt.), and five other 
chemical and pharmaceutical firms. The 
research centre draws on the city’s long 
connections with the chemical industry. 
Due to multiplying effects, the first 
launches were followed by other CRC-like 
organizations (for example, a renewable 
energy and green technologies R and D 
centre in Szeged), working under similar 
conditions to those of supported CRCs.  
All such organizations develop and 
use a joint research infrastructure and 
manage jointly any knowledge produced. 
All rights to products, technologies and 
intellectual property are shared under a 
contract drawn up before the first step 
in joint development is taken. A CRC of-
fers parties the chance to develop coop-
erative, interdisciplinary research in 
stimulating directions. The formation of 
CRCs and similar organizations has 
greatly increased the proportion of pri-
vate capital involved in innovation proc-
esses. 
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Spin-off companies: diversification 
of the knowledge-based industry 
Spin-off companies occur when a former 
employee or employees of a company 
with a certain technology or essential 
knowledge leave to start their own firm. 
The features of small technology-based 
companies make spin-offs one of the 
most promising ways to commercialize 
technology or knowledge. While estab-
lished companies only adopt easily new 
technologies closely aligned to their exist-
ing products, spin-offs are able to ab-
sorb technologies at an early stage and 
build them up for market entry. Tech-
nology start-up companies have flexibil-
ity, so that they can change business di-
rection as the market requires, whereas 
established companies have standard pro-
cedures and much less ability to adapt 
and tailor early-stage technologies as 
needed. Furthermore, the proximity of 
spin-offs to the birthplace of technologies 
can assure ongoing support from inven-
tors in completing the process of trans-
ferring the technology.  
Spin-off companies can be catego-
rized according to the attributes of their 
source organizations (Oakey 1995), as 
higher-education institutions (university 
spin-offs) or industrial firms (corporate 
spin-offs). The former type predominates 
because universities more frequently en-
courage transfer of knowledge than pri-
vate companies do.  
The entrepreneurial spirit is par-
ticularly important in the formation of 
spin-off companies, irrespective of their 
features. Research shows that the EU 
lags behind the United States in entre-
preneurship (COM 2003), the main fac-
tor being a general European aversion to 
risk-taking. In the United States, the 
brightest young people found their own 
businesses, and in case of failure, keep 
trying to found new companies until they 
succeed, or after several failed attempts, 
apply for a job instead. In Europe, those 
starting new businesses tend to be the 
ones who cannot find a decent job. This 
has resulted in a huge ‘entrepreneurship 
deficit’ in Western Europe. The US en-
trepreneurial philosophy popularized 
many years ago spin-offs that built up 
into legendary prestigious clusters such 
as Silicon Valley in California and Route 
128 near Boston. Meanwhile the lack of 
motivation in many European countries 
has meant that spin-off companies are 
less favoured among scientists and 
launches have been opposed by universi-
ties on several occasions. 
The spin-off formation process has 
been investigated in Hungary, as a way 
of studying how the European tendency 
is prevailing in a developing economy 
and what main obstacles are impeding 
the establishment of technology-based 
companies (Buzás 2003). The study 
treated all scientists with marketable sci-
entific results and university students as 
potential entrepreneurs. The latter pro-
vided valuable information on the defi-
ciencies in an education system focused 
mainly on the needs of multinationals 
and neglectful of topics specific to small 
businesses. The results pointed to three 
main gaps: in motivation, competence 
and reputation.  
Many scientists refuse to go into 
business on the grounds that they prefer 
invention to selling (a motivation gap). 
This barrier could only be overcome by 
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reducing fears of an uncertain financial 
future.  
If scientists are motivated enough, 
an academic career can serve as a good 
platform for a launching company, but 
this is impeded by limited experience in 
commercial matters (a competence gap). 
Even commercially-oriented researchers 
have limited capabilities in finance or 
intellectual property rights. They need an 
advisor with managerial abilities to trans-
form the research results into a business 
success.  
Even a successfully launched spin-
off company, however, cannot guarantee 
prosperity, for which the credibility and 
trust are required (a ‘reputation’ gap). 
Entrepreneurs do not have much time to 
become known. Young spin-off compa-
nies are in constant need of guarantors 
to vouch for their technical expertise 
and creditworthiness. 
In 2002, the Hungarian government 
set out to encourage the formation of 
spin-off companies by calling for applica-
tions for establishment grants of  40,000 
each. This can use for preparing a fea-
sibility study, adapting research results, 
acquiring know-how, protecting intellec-
tual property rights, or preparing proto-
types. However, the small number of ap-
plications (34) confirms that entrepre-
neurship in Hungary primarily faces mo-
tivational, rather than financial obstacles. 
The main task, therefore, is to induce an 
entrepreneurial climate in universities 
through training and by disseminating 
success stories. 
Missing TLOs: the imperfect Triple 
Helix 
A number of modelling concepts for 
university–industry–government relations 
have been proposed in the last decade, 
one of the better-known being the Triple 
Helix (Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz 1996), 
which defines the three separate spheres 
institutionally. In this innovation model, 
knowledge transfer is no longer consid-
ered a linear process from origin to ap-
plication, but a complex system with 
unique communication interfaces operat-
ing in a distributive mode. The interac-
tions between the spheres are mediated 
by special organizations such as technol-
ogy transfer offices and innovation agen-
cies. 
Technology transfer offices were 
not prominent in the university–industry 
nexus until the end of 1980, when the 
US Bayh-Dole Act allowed universities 
and other non-profit organizations to 
patent and commercialize the results of 
discoveries made under government-
funded research (Schmoch 1999). Because 
most research at US universities is so 
funded, the act marked a breakthrough 
in university–industry relations, with 
technology transfer offices being estab-
lished throughout North America in the 
1980s and completing the Triple Helix. 
Many other countries then followed the 
US practice by setting up similar institu-
tional frameworks for university–industry 
technology collaborations and commer-
cialization of university inventions (WIPO 
2002). These, now known universally as 
TLOs (technology licensing offices) re-
gardless of their institutional arrange-
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ments, play a crucial role in identifying 
technologies with high commercial poten-
tial and assisting inventors in their li-
censing negotiations. 
Countries have followed different 
patterns in commercializing scientific dis-
coveries, in line with traditional differ-
ences in innovation policy. The bottom-up 
US policy is focused mainly on creating 
incentives for universities to commercial-
ize their inventions themselves. Federal 
action fosters experimentation in univer-
sity policy, on how best to exploit the 
windfall of intellectual property rights 
created by the Bayh-Dole Act. The Swed-
ish way, on the other hand, differs 
strongly, for the government attempts to 
create directly a mechanism facilitating 
the commercialization. Bureaucratic inter-
ventions push Swedish universities to-
wards an internal policy focused on 
marketing intellectual assets. According 
to Goldfarb and Henrekson (2003), this 
top-down model resembles the one found 
in most EU countries. This ‘European 
way’ has proved much less effective than 
the US approach, because it lacks incen-
tives for European scientists to become 
personally involved in the transactions.  
Economic policy in Hungary in the 
second half of the last century broke the 
traditionally close relationship between 
research and production. Since the 
change of economic system in the 1990s, 
the knowledge flow from companies to 
universities has resumed increasingly, but 
the opposite flow of information is still 
not supported by the institutions con-
cerned (Papanek and Borsi 2001). De-
spite increasing governmental financial 
support for R and D, the lack of effec-
tive TLOs at Hungarian universities has 
left an imperfect triple helix that hinders 
effective commercialization of inventions. 
This situation has been induced 
primarily by the status of intellectual 
property rights on inventions. Because of 
shortage of capital, universities and re-
search institutes had no funds to cover 
the submission and maintenance costs of 
patents, so that they had to release their 
primacy rights on in-house inventions. 
Intellectual property rights in recent dec-
ades have therefore been awarded di-
rectly to inventors or entered the unpro-
tected public domain. This is the opposite 
to US practice, where patent rights are 
generally awarded to universities. 
Without a solid patent portfolio, 
units dealing with technology transfer at 
Hungarian universities have been unable 
to establish fruitful industrial links in the 
last decade. The emerging TLOs have not 
found an established business environ-
ment, so that they cannot act as effective 
knowledge dealers. Despite their relative 
inefficiency, the self-organized TLOs and 
their route-searching lend a bottom-up 
character to Hungarian policy on com-
mercialization of university knowledge, 
while the governmental interventions de-
scribed (CRCs and spin-off encourage-
ment) reflect top-down characteristics. 
Science parks in Hungary: seed-
beds or fantasies? 
There is no uniformly accepted definition 
of a science park, and as was pointed 
out by Kung (1995), there are thirty 
terms used to describe similar organiza-
tions, including science park, research 
park, technology park, innovation centre, 
and so on, with no clear distinctions be-
tween them. MacDonald (1987) con-
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cluded that most of these terms share 
two characteristics: 
* property-based development close to a 
place of learning;  
* high-quality units in a pleasant 
environment.  
Westhead (1997) emphasized that 
such parks could serve as catalysts for 
the transfer of research into production. 
Using a business-focused approach, Sto-
rey and Tether (1998) defined the role 
of science parks as enabling commer-
cialization of the research ideas at local 
universities and establishing businesses 
using sophisticated technologies. An over-
all definition was given by the UK Sci-
ence Park Association, which described 
them as property-based initiatives:  
* with formal and operational links with 
a university or other higher educa-
tional institutions or major centre of 
research; 
* encouraging the formation and growth 
of knowledge-based businesses and 
other organizations normally resident 
on site; and 
* with a management actively engaged 
in transferring technology and busi-
ness skills to the organizations on the 
site. 
The development of science parks 
in Europe received its impetus from the 
success of early parks in the United 
States. Many European countries did not 
have a significant number until the 
1980s. By the mid-1990s, there were 310 
science parks in the 15 EU countries, 
with 15,000 firms employing more than 
230,000 (Storey and Thether 1998). 
However, writers express doubts 
about the role of science parks in inno-
vation processes. Massey et al. (1992) 
found that geographical proximity be-
tween a university and a science park 
was only a weak promoter of technology 
transfer and styled such parks ‘high tech 
fantasies’. An empirical survey of over 
160 on and off-park high-tech firms in 
Israel found only a weak relationship 
between location and innovation level 
(Felsenstein 1994). These results suggest 
that the parks play an innovation-
entrenching role rather than an innova-
tion-inducing one. Reporting on a survey 
of Surrey Research Park, Vedovello 
(1997) argues that proximity cannot 
strengthen the formal links between uni-
versity and industry, but proves impor-
tant for informal connections. Bakouros 
et al. (2002) also found mainly informal 
links between firms and a local univer-
sity in Greek science parks, but an ab-
sence of research-type synergies.  
By contrast, Löfsten and Lindelöf 
(2002) recently described significant dif-
ferences between on and off-park com-
panies in their links with a local univer-
sity. Their analysis of 10 science parks 
and 273 firms in Sweden by statistical 
methods detected a role for university-
industry formal links in the development 
of new technology-based firms. Concern-
ing the effectiveness of those located in 
science parks, however, they found no 
greater R and D outputs from on-park 
than from off-park firms.  
These uncertainties about the rela-
tion between intensity of formal technol-
ogy transfer and geographical proximity 
in science parks might be resolved by a 
service-based explanation. Science parks 
are a particularly suitable type of loca-
tion for new businesses and are associ-
ated with entrepreneurs with a stronger 
motivation to innovate than off-park lo-
cations are. The new technology-based 
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firms, however, are generally unable to 
utilize such advantages without training 
courses, business-placement programmes 
(Löfsten and Lindelöf 2002) and assisted 
networking organized by the park man-
agement. For this reason, the factor of 
success in a science park rests in man-
aged business services creating more 
formalized technology relations, which 
result in more profitable new technology-
based firms. 
Several organizations in Hungary 
describe themselves as an innovation or 
research park. However, they cannot be 
classed as ‘seedbeds’ of innovation in the 
sense envisaged by Felsenstein (1994), as 
they lack a critical mass of private firms 
and have hardly developed technology-
based relations with universities. Only 
one site in Hungary (Infopark in Buda-
pest) possesses the commonly accepted 
features of a science park. Infopark In-
corporation was established at the end of 
1996 by the Budapest University of 
Technology, Loránd Eötvös University of 
Sciences (ELTE), the Ministry of the 
Economy and the Prime Minister’s Office. 
Two universities hold 25 per cent +1 of 
the voting shares, and Hungarian state 
has a gold share to ensure use of the 
park remains the same. The location is 
ideal for links and synergies between 
firms and universities, as it lies adjacent 
to their Danube-side campuses. In line 
with the two universities’ existing pro-
files, the park specializes in information 
and communication technologies, aiming 
to attract firms with experience in com-
puter technology, telecommunications and 
multimedia. The first settler was the big-
gest Hungarian telecom company, Matáv, 
with a new R and D centre. It was fol-
lowed by Hungarian subsidiaries of IBM, 
Hewlett Packard, Nortel and Panasonic. 
After five years, Barta (2002) sur-
veyed the functional linkages and real 
services of the Infopark. She found that 
Infopark was still unable to attract fur-
ther settlers with any technology infor-
mation services, contract R and D ser-
vices, market studies, auditing, quality 
management services or product promo-
tions. The lack of accessible central ser-
vices obliged the firms to build up such 
services in-house, which constrained fu-
ture cooperation within the Park. The 
absence of real services means that In-
fopark cannot serve as an intermediary. 
Despite some excellent facilities, it oper-
ates simply as an ‘office park’.  
The government, regarding innova-
tion processes as vital to regional devel-
opment, decided two years ago to define 
various evolutionary paths for the many 
industrial estates in Hungary. One of the 
four desired goals was to be a science 
park with participation by universities or 
research institutions. As Barta (2002) 
concluded, successful science parks in a 
transition economy need considerable, 
persistent governmental support if they 
are to offer the services that can give 
life to them. Since transition governments 
have limited resources, they should focus 
on a small number of estates, where the 
conditions are promising for value-added 
internal services. Otherwise firms will 
continue to ignore them. 
 
* * * * * 
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